The honest answer, first
SIM Owner Details by Number: What’s Actually Possible in Pakistan
The honest answer, first: there is no legal tool, website, or SMS shortcode in Pakistan that returns a stranger’s name, home address, or CNIC from their phone number. If a page, app, or “agent” promises “SIM owner details by number,” it is either lying to collect your money or breaking the law to get the data — sometimes both. This page explains exactly what the real government tools do instead, and what you can lawfully do if someone is bothering you from an unknown number.
No Sugarcoating
Why you’re searching for this
You’ve probably got a missed call, a WhatsApp message, or a number that’s been calling at odd hours, and you want a name to put to it. That’s a completely understandable instinct — it’s the same instinct that makes people ask “who is this?” out loud.
The problem isn’t the question. The problem is that in Pakistan, the honest answer to “how do I find a SIM owner’s details by number” is: you can’t, not legally, and not through any tool aimed at the public. What follows isn’t a brush-off — it’s a straight explanation of why that’s the case, what the government’s real verification tools actually do (which is much narrower than most SEO pages claim), and what you can actually do about the number that’s bothering you.
What no one can lawfully give you. No website, SMS code, app, or paid “agent” can legally hand you another person’s SIM owner name, home address, or CNIC number just because you have their phone number. Under the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act (PECA) 2016, Section 16, obtaining or using another person’s identity information without authorisation is a criminal offence — punishable by up to three years’ imprisonment, a fine of up to Rs 5,000,000, or both. This applies to the person supplying the data and the person asking for it. The only lawful route to a specific person’s subscriber identity is a formal investigation by a police officer or investigation agency, conducted under PECA 2016 together with the Investigation Rules 2018 — never a public website, never a “connections” fee, never an informal favour from someone who works at a telecom operator.
The Real Tools
The four government tools — and what each one actually does
Pakistan does have real, working, government-linked SIM verification tools. The confusion online comes from sites that blur what these tools do, implying one of them can look up a stranger.
They can’t. Here is exactly what each one is for, with nothing added and nothing left out.
1. Sending your CNIC to 668 — your own SIM count, nothing else
PTA’s SIM Information System lets you text your 13-digit CNIC number, with no dashes, to the short code 668. It replies with a table showing how many SIMs are currently registered against that CNIC, broken down per mobile operator — voice and data connections counted separately. That’s the entire output. It does not return names, phone numbers, or activation dates, even when you send your own CNIC. The service costs roughly Rs 2 including tax, and it only works from a live Pakistani SIM — it can’t be used from abroad or from a number that isn’t currently active on a local network.
This service has a long, well-documented history. PTA’s SIM Information System was launched at a PTA Consumer Forum, inaugurated by the Secretary of IT & Telecom, and at launch the system was built to handle roughly 100 million subscriber records (pta.gov.pk press release). A related PTA release dates the “SIM Information System 668” service specifically to October 2009, and separately references a “789 SIM Activation System” from February 2009 as an earlier, related SIM-activation effort — PTA’s own material cites both dates without claiming one system simply replaced the other, so we won’t assert that either. Since its launch, PTA reports that over 12.6 million subscribers have used the SIM Information System, and roughly 60% of the web-based (portal) queries have come from overseas Pakistanis — which is part of why the web portal below exists as a separate, worldwide-accessible option.
2. cnic.sims.pk — the free web portal, works from anywhere
If you’re outside Pakistan, or you’d rather not send an SMS, PTA’s web-based equivalent is cnic.sims.pk. It’s free, requires no login or app installation, and works from any country. On-screen, the portal identifies itself as the “PMD SIM Information System” — that’s the exact branding shown on the page itself; we’re reporting what we observed first-hand, and since no PTA publication we could find spells out what “PMD” stands for, we’re not going to guess. The portal has two tabs — one for CNIC holders, one for Foreign ID holders — and requires you to solve a reCAPTCHA before it returns a result.
The result is a dated table, not a document and not a name list. It shows, per network — Jazz, Telenor, Ufone/PTML, and Zong, listed even when a network shows zero SIMs against that CNIC — three columns: Voice+Data SIMs, Data Only SIMs, and Total SIMs. There is no separate row for ONIC (its numbers fold into Ufone/PTML) and no separate row for SCO, which serves Azad Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan. At no point does the portal display a phone number, a person’s name, or an activation date. It answers exactly one question — “how many SIMs are registered against this CNIC, per network, right now” — and nothing else.
PTA has separately built a related online facility specifically for overseas Pakistanis, letting them regularise or block extra SIMs registered against their own CNIC without needing to visit Pakistan in person. That facility is available both on the PTA website and through cellular operators’ own websites; PTA’s general helpline for related queries is 0800-55055.
3. Sending “MNP” to 667 — a self-check, and only a self-check
This is the one tool in this list that does return a name — and it’s also the one most often misdescribed. Sending the text “MNP” to 667 returns information about the SIM that sent the message: its own registered name, a partly masked CNIC, its IMSI, its activation date, and its connection type (voice, data, or hybrid). That’s useful for confirming your own SIM’s registration is correct and current.
What it cannot do, under any circumstances, is accept someone else’s phone number as an input. There’s no field to type in a different number, no follow-up code that redirects the query, no trick. It was built exclusively to let a SIM check itself, and every description online that implies you can “use 667 to check someone else’s number” is simply wrong — the shortcode has no mechanism to do that.
4. Sending “N” plus a number to 76367 — network only
Texting the letter “N” followed by an 11-digit mobile number to 76367 tells you which network that number currently belongs to — Jazz, Zong, Telenor, or Ufone. The cost is roughly Rs 2 plus tax. That is genuinely all it returns. It will never give you a name, a CNIC, an address, or a location, no matter whose number you send. If you’ve seen a claim that 76367 can be combined with something else to reveal an owner’s identity, that claim is false — the two pieces of information (network, and identity) are handled by completely separate, non-interoperable systems.
| Tool | What you send | What it returns | Whose data |
|---|---|---|---|
| 668 (SMS) | Your 13-digit CNIC, no dashes | Per-operator SIM count only | Your own CNIC only |
| cnic.sims.pk (web) | CNIC or Foreign ID + reCAPTCHA | Dated per-network counts table | Your own CNIC/ID only |
| 667 (SMS “MNP”) | Nothing but the word MNP | Your own name, masked CNIC, IMSI, activation date, connection type | The sending SIM only — never another number |
| 76367 (SMS “N”+number) | An 11-digit mobile number | That number’s current network only | Works on any number, but reveals network only — never identity |
These are four separate tools built for four separate purposes. Three of the four never show a name under any input. The one that does — 667 — only ever discloses the sender’s own record. No combination of these four tools, in any order, produces a stranger’s name, address, or CNIC.
Asaan Zabaan Mein
Kya Kisi Number Se SIM Owner Ka Naam Pata Chal Sakta Hai?
Seedhi baat yeh hai: Pakistan mein koi bhi qanooni tareeqa maujood nahi jis se aap kisi ajnabi ke phone number se uska naam, ghar ka pata, ya CNIC nikaal saken. Jo website ya “agent” yeh dawa kare ke woh yeh kaam kar sakta hai, woh ya to paisay ka fraud kar raha hai, ya khud qanoon tor raha hai.
Asal mein jo tools maujood hain, unka daira bohat mehdood hai. 668 par apna CNIC bhejein to sirf yeh pata chalta hai ke us CNIC par kitni SIMs registered hain — naam ya number nahi milta. Yehi kaam web par cnic.sims.pk free mein kar deta hai. 667 par “MNP” likh kar bhejne se sirf apni SIM ka naam, masked CNIC, aur activation date milti hai — kisi doosre number ke liye kaam nahi karta. 76367 par “N” plus number bhej kar sirf network — Jazz, Zong, Telenor, ya Ufone — pata chalta hai, naam ya pata nahi.
Agar koi kisi doosre insan ki SIM details nikalne ki koshish kare ya beche, to yeh PECA 2016 ki Section 16 ke tehat jurm hai — saza teen saal tak qaid, Rs 50 lakh tak jurmana, ya dono, aur yeh dene aur lene wale dono par barabar laagu hota hai.
Agar koi anjaan number tang kar raha hai, to khud usay trace karne ki koshish na karein. Iske bajaye complaint.pta.gov.pk par PTA ko shikayat darj karayein, ya NCCIA ki 24/7 helpline 1799 par rabta karein — yehi idaray qanooni investigation ke zariye asal shanakht maloom kar sakte hain, aap khud yeh kaam qanooni tor par nahi kar sakte.
A Different Checklist
Legacy biometric-verification-status codes (a different thing entirely)
A separate, older set of shortcodes exists purely to confirm that your own SIM’s biometric re-verification is current — not to look anyone up.
PTA published this list on 1 June 2023: Jazz subscribers send their CNIC to 6001; Telenor subscribers send any SMS to 7751 (retailers use 7750); Zong subscribers send the letter “V” to 7911, free of charge; Ufone subscribers dial *336# and select menu option 1; and legacy Warid numbers send their CNIC to 789. Like every other tool on this page, these only ever check the SIM that’s doing the checking.
All of this sits on top of what PTA calls the Multi Random Finger Biometric Verification System (MBVS) — the official name, per PTA’s own Biometric Verification page. MBVS performs live, online verification against NADRA’s records for six specific actions: a new SIM purchase, a duplicate SIM issue, a change of ownership, mobile number portability (MNP), periodic re-verification, and SIM disowning. A maximum of two successful thumb or finger impressions are required, and they’re only meant to be captured at Customer Service Centres, franchise outlets, or registered retailers using an authorised MBVS device. PTA has explicitly warned that fraudsters try to collect fingerprints on unauthorised machines, or even on paper, “in the garb of government officials” — never provide a biometric impression outside a verified, authorised outlet, no matter how official the request sounds. Relatedly, PTA has published that roughly 85% of SIMs used in fraud cases are registered against female CNIC holders — a real, sourced vulnerability, and a strong reason for women in particular to periodically re-check their own registration count via 668 or cnic.sims.pk.
The Real Cap
How many SIMs can actually be registered to one CNIC?
The Supreme Court of Pakistan set the current cap on 5 November 2015: a maximum of eight SIMs total per CNIC — five voice connections and three data-only connections.
Foreign nationals and Pakistan Origin Card (POC) holders are capped lower, at two SIMs. If you see a figure of “25 SIMs per CNIC,” or a claim that the cap was “reduced to 6 in December 2025,” treat both as unsourced myths circulating online — we found no Supreme Court order, PTA notification, or any other primary source supporting either number, and they should not be repeated as fact. The verified figure, unchanged since 2015, remains eight.
If You’re Being Bothered
If someone is genuinely harassing you
This is usually the real situation behind the search — an unknown number that keeps calling, a threatening WhatsApp message, or a suspicious contact you want identified. The lawful path here isn’t to try to unmask the number yourself; it’s to report it to the agency that’s actually authorised to act on it.
- File a formal complaint at PTA’s portal, complaint.pta.gov.pk, for issues involving telecom operators, SIM misuse, or unregistered numbers.
- Message RAABTA, PTA’s public WhatsApp self-service assistant, at 0315-0055055. RAABTA (its internal formal name is the PTA Digital Assistant) launched on 26 February 2026 and exists to guide complaints and answer service queries — it is not a lookup tool and cannot return anyone’s identity.
- Call the NCCIA cyber helpline, 1799, for anything involving threats, blackmail, harassment, or fraud. The National Cyber Crime Investigation Agency runs this line 24/7; it launched on 3 June 2025 and took over cybercrime investigation duties from FIA’s Cybercrime Wing in April 2025. You can also file online at complaint.nccia.gov.pk. If you’ve seen the older “1991” number quoted anywhere as the cybercrime helpline, that number is retired and wrong — always use 1799.
These agencies, unlike you or any paid “agent,” can lawfully compel a telecom operator to disclose a specific person’s subscriber information — but only inside a formal investigation, following the Investigation Rules 2018. That authority genuinely does not extend to informal requests, favours from an employee at an operator, or any paid intermediary, and using one exposes both the requester and the supplier to prosecution under PECA 2016 Section 16.
Setting The Record Straight
Claims worth actively debunking
A number of specific claims circulate around this exact search topic. Because getting these details wrong has real consequences — panic, wasted money, or trusting a scam — here’s what we could and couldn’t verify.
“Operation Clean Sweep 3.0” and a “72-hour suspension window”
We found no PTA press release, notification, or official statement anywhere referencing a programme by this name, nor a genuine 72-hour suspension rule. This appears to be viral misinformation with no traceable PTA source. If you’ve seen it mentioned, treat it purely as an unverified claim circulating online — not a real programme. The actual, published enforcement timeline PTA has used for an unauthorised or unregistered SIM, dating from the original SIM Information System 668 rollout, is: a 7-day notice to register the connection, calling suspended after 13 days of non-compliance, and the SIM fully blocked after 17 days. That’s the real sequence — three defined stages over 17 days, not a single 72-hour cutoff.
“SVMS” and “CSMD”
Terms like “Subscriber Verification Management System” (SVMS) and “Central SIM Database” (CSMD) show up on some SEO and competitor sites as if they were official PTA system names. We could not find either term used anywhere on pta.gov.pk. PTA’s own material simply calls the SMS-668 service the “SIM Information System 668.” If you’ve come across SVMS or CSMD elsewhere, treat them as unofficial terminology with no confirmed PTA source — not names of real government systems.
Two different SIM-blocking numbers — don’t mix them up
You may have seen the figure 4,906,611 SIMs quoted as if it were a 2026 enforcement result. That number is actually NADRA’s 17 June 2025 announcement of the planned scope of a phased SIM-blocking exercise — reported the same day by Express Tribune, The Nation, and TechJuice — and it describes a plan, not SIMs actually blocked. The real, separate 2026 enforcement figure is 1.838 million illegal SIMs blocked between January and July 2026, reported in August 2026, made up of 903,230 tied to deceased CNIC holders, 244,357 tied to invalid, expired, or cancelled CNICs, and 691,102 blocked for other reasons. These are two unrelated figures from two different points in time — they should never be added together or quoted interchangeably.
Where Enforcement Actually Lands
Operators get held accountable — the public doesn’t get a shortcut
It’s worth being clear that accountability in this system runs through the operators and PTA, not through a public lookup.
A concrete, current example: PTA fined Jazz Rs 38.9 million, reported on 31 August 2026 by Business Recorder and Daily Pakistan, after finding the operator’s documentation “incomplete” and lacking “mandatory corporate authorisations and end-user credentials” for nearly 400 corporate SIMs issued in one company’s name without proper authorisation. PTA stated plainly that “an operator’s responsibility does not end once a corporate SIM is issued,” and that operators cannot delegate verification responsibility to corporate customers or sales channels. Jazz was ordered to pay within 30 days of the ruling. This is the actual accountability mechanism in this space — regulatory fines against operators for verification failures — not a public database anyone can query.
What’s Coming Next
Where biometric verification is headed
In August 2026, a public disagreement surfaced between NADRA and PTA over extending SIM verification to facial recognition.
NADRA’s “PakID” app, built on NADRA’s own biometric verification services, had been proposed back in 2025 as the basis for facial-recognition SIM verification, and cellular operators had already completed a proof of concept using it. By August 2026, however, NADRA proposed a different approach instead: telecom operators would install their own facial-capture equipment at outlets, with data transmitted to the operators and then on to NADRA for verification, while operators would be barred from storing any biometric data themselves — rather than routing verification through PakID directly. PTA responded that it is exploring alternatives, including one operator’s own mobile app, ahead of a further proof of concept (reported by ProPakistani, 25 August 2026). As of this writing, this is an unresolved disagreement between two government bodies about method — facial-recognition SIM verification is not yet live for the public under either proposal.
Device, Not SIM
DIRBS: a related but separate system (device, not SIM)
People sometimes confuse SIM verification with DIRBS — the Device Identification, Registration and Blocking System — because both involve PTA and both can result in a phone becoming unusable.
DIRBS was developed under the Telecommunication Policy 2015 and works off a device’s IMEI plus other parameters to identify, monitor, and regulate handsets, generating black, exception, and notification lists. It targets counterfeit devices, illegally imported devices on which import tax hasn’t been paid, invalid or duplicate IMEIs, and stolen or lost phones — it has nothing to do with identifying a SIM’s owner. You can check a device’s status by SMSing its IMEI to 8484, through the dirbs.pta.gov.pk portal, or via the DIRBS Android app.
A few 2026 updates worth knowing: the DIRBS portal had a planned system-upgrade outage from 5:00 PM on 3 July 2026 to 4:00 AM on 6 July 2026, moving to an in-house-developed platform aimed at simpler, faster device registration and stronger backend compliance. In August 2026, PTA announced plans to bring AI-driven capabilities into DIRBS operations — an announced direction, not a feature that’s live yet. PTA also used this same period to publicly dismiss a social-media rumour that mobile device tax could be paid in instalments through DIRBS — no such directive exists. That’s a second example, alongside the fabricated “Clean Sweep 3.0” claim above, of PTA itself having to correct viral misinformation in this exact space — a good reminder to treat unsourced claims about SIM or device rules with real scepticism, including ones on this topic.
Managing Your Own Connections
Rules that affect your own SIM registration
A few current rules are useful to know if you’re managing your own connections rather than trying to identify someone else’s:
- Disowning a SIM — removing a connection you no longer recognise from your CNIC — carries a fee capped at Rs 200, waived entirely if fraud is confirmed, a rule in force since 1 January 2024.
- A 365-day lock applies to every SIM: it cannot be disowned or transferred within 365 days of its own activation date. This is a fixed lock, not a shrinking window, per a PTA advisory effective 24 May 2026.
- New SIM sales are barred nationwide between midnight and 6am, a restriction in force since 19 May 2026.
- Buying a second new SIM in a short span triggers roughly a 7-day wait before the purchase is allowed, a rule in force since January 2024.
Separately, Telenor Pakistan’s amalgamation into PTML (Ufone’s parent company) was completed on 1 July 2026 — if you’re on a Telenor connection, this is why some of your account handling may now route through PTML/Ufone channels.
Spot The Pattern
How to recognise a fake “SIM owner lookup” site or agent
Because this is such a heavily searched question, it attracts a predictable set of scams. None of these are hypothetical — they follow the same handful of patterns, and once you can name the pattern, they stop being convincing.
The “instant results” page
A site invites you to type in a phone number and promises a name, address, and photo within seconds, often with a countdown timer or a fake “records found: 1” message designed to create urgency. No legitimate Pakistani database — government or private — returns identity data this way. If a page shows you a result before you’ve paid anything, that “preview” is almost always fabricated to get you to the payment screen, not a real match.
The “pay to unlock” flow
These sites ask for a small payment — often through easy-load, mobile wallet, or a card — to “unlock” the full report. Once paid, the report either never arrives, arrives as generic filler text, or the site asks for a second, larger payment to “verify” the result. This is a straightforward advance-fee scam; the actual product being sold isn’t information, it’s your payment details and repeat charges.
The “official database access” claim
Some sites or individuals claim to have “access to the PTA database,” a “direct NADRA connection,” or a “leaked telecom database.” No such claim should be trusted. PTA and NADRA do not sell or license subscriber-identity lookups to third parties, and any dataset offered this way is either fabricated, stale, or was obtained illegally — meaning anyone using it is exposed under PECA 2016 Section 16 regardless of what the seller calls it.
The “friendly contact at the telecom company” offer
This one is more personal: someone claims to know a staff member at Jazz, Zong, Telenor, or Ufone who can “quietly check” a number for a fee or a favour. This is not a grey area — it is the same offence described above, committed by both sides, and it’s also precisely the kind of internal-access misuse that regulatory fines like the Rs 38.9 million Jazz penalty above exist to deter. An employee who actually did this would be risking their job and prosecution, not doing you a favour.
What to do instead when you spot one of these
Don’t pay, don’t share your own CNIC or card details to “verify your identity” before a lookup, and don’t provide a biometric scan to anyone outside an authorised CSC, franchise, or registered retailer. If you’ve already lost money to one of these sites, that itself is reportable — file at complaint.pta.gov.pk if it involved a telecom-branded scam, or through NCCIA’s 1799 helpline or complaint.nccia.gov.pk if it was a broader online fraud. Treat the request for money or credentials as the actual signal, more reliable than anything the site claims about its data source.
The Logic Behind It
Why the system is built this way
It’s worth understanding the logic behind these restrictions rather than just accepting them, because it explains why no future update to 668, cnic.sims.pk, 667, or 76367 is ever likely to add a “search by number, get a name” feature.
Pakistan’s CNIC is a national identity credential tied to NADRA’s civil registry, and a phone number is comparatively easy to obtain, spoof, or reassign. Letting any member of the public resolve a number straight to a name and home address would turn every SIM registration record into an open directory — usable just as easily by a stalker, a fraud ring running social-engineering scams, or a debt collector operating outside the law, as by someone with a genuine, legitimate reason to ask. That’s precisely the harm PECA 2016 Section 16 was written to prevent, and it’s why the verification tools that do exist were deliberately scoped to self-checks (668, cnic.sims.pk, 667) or the single narrowest possible public utility (76367’s network-only lookup) rather than a general-purpose identity search. The gap between “what people search for” and “what the law allows” isn’t an oversight or a missing feature — it’s the intended design.
What Happens Next
What actually happens after you file a complaint
It helps to know what to expect once you’ve reported a number, rather than assuming nothing will happen because you don’t get an immediate name back.
A PTA complaint filed at complaint.pta.gov.pk is logged against the relevant operator, who is required to investigate and respond — this is the same regulatory channel that produced the Rs 38.9 million Jazz penalty above, so operators do treat these complaints as compliance exposure, not noise. An NCCIA report through the 1799 helpline or complaint.nccia.gov.pk is different in kind: it opens a cybercrime case file, and if the matter genuinely warrants identifying the person behind a number — ongoing harassment, blackmail, or financial fraud — that identification happens through NCCIA’s own formal investigative powers under PECA 2016 and the Investigation Rules 2018, not through anything you could access yourself. Keep records as you go: screenshots of messages, call logs with timestamps, and any payment or transaction details if money was involved. None of this requires you to know who the number belongs to before you report it — that’s the part the investigating agency handles, and it’s precisely the part no public tool is allowed to hand you directly.
Wrapping Up
The bottom line
If you came here hoping to type in a number and get back a name and address, the honest answer is that this doesn’t exist as a legal public service in Pakistan, and any site or contact claiming otherwise is either running a scam or asking you to break the law with them.
What genuinely exists is narrower and more useful than it sounds: 668 and cnic.sims.pk let you audit how many SIMs are registered to your own CNIC, 667 confirms your own SIM’s registration details, and 76367 tells you which network any number belongs to. For anything involving another person’s identity — a harassing caller, a suspicious number, a fraud attempt — the lawful next step is a formal complaint to PTA or NCCIA, not a lookup. That route is slower than a shortcut promise, but it’s the only one that’s real.
Common Questions
Frequently asked questions
How can I find SIM owner details by number in Pakistan?
You cannot legally obtain a stranger’s SIM owner details (name, address, CNIC) just from their phone number — no such public tool exists. You can only check your own registration (via 668 or cnic.sims.pk) or a number’s network (via 76367). For anything involving another person’s identity, the lawful route is reporting through PTA or NCCIA, not a direct lookup.
Is there a way to see who owns a SIM card?
Not for a stranger’s SIM, no. You can see who owns your own SIM by sending “MNP” to 667, which returns your own registered name, a partly masked CNIC, IMSI, activation date, and connection type. That tool only ever discloses the sender’s own record — it cannot be pointed at anyone else’s number.
Can I find SIM no detail online for free?
You can check your own SIM count for free using the cnic.sims.pk web portal (branded on-screen as “PMD SIM Information System”), which works worldwide without login. It returns a dated table of SIM counts per network against your CNIC — not names, not phone numbers, and not anyone else’s details.
Who can legally access someone else’s SIM owner details?
Only a police officer or investigation agency operating under a formal PECA 2016 investigation, following the Investigation Rules 2018, can lawfully require an operator to disclose a specific person’s SIM information. This authority does not extend to informal contacts, paid “agents,” or the general public, even the victim in a harassment case.
Does sending my CNIC to 668 show the SIM owner’s name?
No. 668 returns only a per-operator SIM count against the CNIC you send — how many voice and data connections exist per network. It never shows names, phone numbers, or activation dates, even for your own CNIC. The fee is roughly Rs 2 including tax, and it only works from a live Pakistani SIM.
Does cnic.sims.pk show phone numbers or names?
No. The portal, which displays on-screen as “PMD SIM Information System,” returns a dated table showing Voice+Data SIMs, Data Only SIMs, and Total SIMs per network (Jazz, Telenor, Ufone/PTML, Zong). It never lists individual phone numbers, names, or CNIC numbers of any registered SIM.
Can 667 be used to check someone else’s number?
No. Sending “MNP” to 667 checks only the SIM that sends the message — it has no facility to accept another person’s number as input. There is no framing or workaround that changes this; it was designed exclusively as a self-verification tool.
What does 76367 actually tell me about a number?
Sending “N” followed by an 11-digit mobile number to 76367 returns only that number’s current network — Jazz, Zong, Telenor, or Ufone — for roughly Rs 2 plus tax. It never returns a name, CNIC, address, or location, regardless of whose number you enter.
What happens if I try to buy SIM owner details from a website or agent?
You risk criminal liability under PECA 2016, Section 16, which makes both obtaining and supplying another person’s identity information without authorisation an offence, punishable by up to three years’ imprisonment, a fine of up to Rs 5,000,000, or both. These “agents” are typically running scams, and your CNIC or payment details are often the real target.
How do I check who owns my own SIM registration?
Send “MNP” to 667 from the SIM in question to see its own registered name, partly masked CNIC, IMSI, activation date, and connection type. To see how many SIMs total are registered across all networks against your CNIC, send your 13-digit CNIC to 668 or use the cnic.sims.pk portal.
What should I do if an unknown number is harassing me?
Report it rather than trying to identify the caller yourself. File a complaint at complaint.pta.gov.pk, message PTA’s RAABTA WhatsApp assistant at 0315-0055055, or call the NCCIA’s 24/7 cyber helpline, 1799, for anything involving threats, blackmail, or fraud. These agencies can lawfully act on the number’s identity; you personally cannot.
Is “Operation Clean Sweep 3.0” a real PTA programme?
No. There is no PTA press release, notification, or official statement referencing any programme by that name, nor a genuine “72-hour suspension window.” The real, published enforcement timeline for an unregistered SIM is a 7-day notice, calling suspended after 13 days, and full blocking after 17 days.
